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INSANITY AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMEt
By ROSZEL C.

THOMSEN*

It is easy to attack the M'Naghten Rules or the opinion
in the Durham' case, or both of them; it is much more difficult to try to work out a reasonable rule. I do not imagine
that I have accomplished that feat; this article merely reexamines the following facets of the problem:
I. Our attitude toward the criminal law, its function
and its purposes, and our knowledge of the different types
of persons with whom the criminal courts must deal.
II. Our knowledge of the nature of mental illness, and
our attitude toward persons suffering therefrom.
III. The development of the prevailing legal rule; and
the proposed alternatives, which should be considered in
light of our present knowledge and of our present attitudes.
I.
To lawyers a "crime" is the omission of any duty commanded, or the commission of any act forbidden, by the
applicable penal law. Most people, however, think of a
"crime" as a gross violation of law and morality, as distinguished from a slight offense; the moral element is important. Those of us who make or administer the criminal
law must keep this in mind, whether or not we agree with
Mr. Justice Holmes that:
"The first requirement of a sound body of law is
that it should correspond with the actual feelings and
' 2
demands of the community, whether right or wrong.
All sorts of social and religious ideas about criminal
acts have prevailed at various times and places, of which
t This article is the product of a talk delivered by the author to The
Lawyers' Round Table on November 6, 1959.
* Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Maryland;
A.B., 1919, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B., 1922, University of Maryland.
IRespectively, 10 C1. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843) and 214 F. 2d 862
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
'HoLMES,
THE COMMON LAW (1881) 41.
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the most influential has probably been the Lex Talionis an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. The desire, if not
the need, for vengeance is deep rooted in human nature.
In early times, most wrongs were avenged privately.
Blood feuds were common. The community intervened
initially to persuade or compel the wronged person or his
family or his tribe to abandon private vengeance and to
accept compensation for the wrong. Later, as civilization
advanced, people came more and more to rely on punishment as an instrument of deterrence.
Pollock and Maitland say: 8
"On the eve of the Norman Conquest what we may
call the criminal law of England (but it was also the
law of torts or civil wrongs) contained four elements
which deserve attention: its past history had in the
main consisted of the varying relations between them.
We have to speak of outlawry, of the blood feud, of the
tariffs of wer and wite, and bot, of punishment in life
and limb. As regards the malefactor the community
may assume one of four attitudes: it may make war
on him; it may have him exposed to the venegeance
of those whom he has wronged; it may suffer him to
make atonement; or it may inflict on him a determinate punishment, death, mutilation or the like."
Until recent times, prisons were not places of punishment, but were used for detaining prisoners until they
could be tried or executed. In the list of Roman penalties,
which included death, exile and beating with rods, there
is no mention of incarceration. A man who declared war
upon society forfeited his right to belong to it and was
better out of the way; society was not called upon to pay
for maintaining him upon the doubtful chance that his
nature might be regenerated. The idea of imprisonment
may well have derived from the monastic system; the
mediaeval church attached great importance to solitude
as a first condition of penitence.
In the eighteenth century Beccaria published his
treatise against arbitrary and savage penalties and insisted
that punishments should be limited to what was necessary
for the defense of the community. The Declaration of the
Rights of Man, enunciated in 1789, contained the first suggestion of a methodical system of imprisonment, and such
"History of English Law, quoted In
ed.) 710, Vol. 6.
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a system appeared in the French Code of 1791. During the
nineteenth century, throughout Western Civilization, imprisonment became the principal punishment for major
crimes.
Almost everyone now agrees that the protection of
society is the primary purpose and function of the criminal
law. The old talion principle of revenge for wrongdoing
has faded into the background; the principles of rehabilitation, deterrence and incapacitation have come to the fore.
A modem judge is apt to look at the problem as one of
crime and correction rather than crime and punishment.
Of course, in certain cases incapacitation of the offender
by a long period of imprisonment, perhaps even by death,
is necessary to protect society. But in most cases the judge
is primarily interested in the rehabilitation of the offender.
This can be accomplished in some cases by probation,4 in
some cases by commitment to a reformatory or other penal
institution, in some cases by a combination of the two.
The certainty of punishment is more important than
its severity." Beccaria's emphasis, two centuries ago, on
the deterrent effects of certainty of capture and certainty
of conviction, is as sound today as it was then.
Studies of normal individuals have revealed a certain
amount of aggression and hostility in everyone. The new
born child is still as savagely amoral as the child produced
by our neolithic ancestors. Socialization should proceed
with physical growth. Unfortunately, we know that in
many cases it does not, although we are likely to overlook
those instances where the failure does not result in criminal conduct. Nonetheless, the psychological differentiation
between the neurotic criminal, who persistently risks his
freedom to acquire money illicitly, and the miser, who
has a monument erected to his memory, may be very fine.
On the great issue of determinism versus free will,
the views of psychiatrists usually differ profoundly from
those of us who have been trained in the legal or correctional disciplines. In certain psychiatric groups, it is a sign
of scientific maturity to go all out for determinism, to believe that man is a helpless victim of his genes and his environment. Some psychiatrists applaud the pronounce' Often

coupled with restitution or a fine paid over a period of time.
The principal value of a long sentence lies in the isolation of the criminal Crimes of aggression are essentially crimes of youth. Seriously
aggressive criminals tend to become less dangerous with advancing years.
The improvement In the conduct of a delinquent after a long prison sentence may be a natural phenomenon rather than a specific response to his
incarceration. Unreasonably long sentences tend to Increase the offender's
resentment toward society.
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ment of Ernest Jones, who said, "[b]y accepting the legal
view of free will [doctors] abandon the only fundamental
canon of all science'.
On the other hand, the sager leaders of American psychiatry have accepted the fact that man is not without
freedom of choice. Franz Alexander, who has been in the
forefront of the psychoanalysts who have studied criminal behavior, recently said of the doctrine of strict determinism:
"The basic error in this whole reasoning is that it
treats the conscious and unconscious portions of the
personality as two completely isolated systems without any intercommunication, like the left hand not
knowing what the right hand is doing. This assumption is contrary to our knowledge. * * * Not only do
unconscious processes influence conscious processes,
but also conversely conscious influence the unconscious. * * * Punishment of careless drivers, even if
their accidents are the result of unconscious motives,
will increase almost every driver's sense of responsibility and consequently his vigilance over his movements. To eliminate punishment for accidents would
' '7
undoubtedly result in an increase in accidents.
There is every reason to believe that income tax
evasion, embezzlement, the sale of narcotics, and many
other crimes would increase tremendously were it not for
the possibility if not the probability of a prison sentence.
Almost all of the judges who attended the Pilot Institute
on Sentencing" concurred in that conclusion.
In Sauer v. United States,9 Judge Barnes said:
"Modern psychiatry to the contrary, the criminal
law is grounded upon the theory that, in the absence
of special conditions, individuals are free to exercise
a choice between possible courses of conduct and hence
are morally responsible. Thus, it is moral guilt that
the law stresses.
"At least one purpose of the penal law is to express a formal social condemnation of forbidden conduct, and buttress that condemnation by sanctions calculated to prevent that which is forbidden.
'Quoted by Guttmacher in The Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 Law and Contemp. Prob. 633, 634 (1958).
'Ibid., 635.
Held this summer (1959) at Boulder, ColoradO.
'241 F. 2d 640, 648 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. den. 354 U.S. 940 (1957).
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"Much of the conflict over the rules of criminal responsibility is attributable to a basic misconception as
to the nature of the problem. Criminal responsibility
is a legal not a medical question. Involved is legal consequence, not medical diagnosis."
It is important, however, to consider the many different types of individuals with whom the criminal courts
0 Dr. Manfred
must deal. In a recent article,"
S. Guttmacher
stated that although no classification of criminals is entirely adequate, he would suggest grouping them under the
following categories:
"1. The normal criminal, the dysocial group made
up of individuals who have identified with the asocial
elements in our society, ....
They compose seventyfive to eighty percent of criminals.
"2. The accidental or occasional criminal, the individual with an essentially healthy superego who has
become overwhelmed by a special set of circumstances.
This is a very small group. On the basis of claims
made by offenders and their families, this group would
appear to be much larger than it actually is. Nearly
every mother whose youthful son becomes involved in
criminal behavior asserts that he is a good boy, but
the momentary victim of bad associates. On investigation, one generally learns that he had for years been
a serious school behaviour problem and a well known
client of the juvenile court.
"3. The organically or constitutionally predisposed
criminal, forming a disparate group which constitutes
a small portion of the total number of criminals and
is comprised of numerous subgroups: the intellectually defective, the postencephalitic, the epileptic, the
senile deteriorative, the posttraumatic, etc. Of course,
the vast majority of persons with these maladies are
noncriminal.
"4. The psychopathic or sociopathic criminal, the
individual who is not psychotic (insane), but who indulges in irrational, anti-social behavior, probably resulting from hidden unconscious neurotic conflicts
which constitute the driving dynamic force underlying
his criminal conduct. This is a complex group, comprising ten to fifteen percent of criminals. Among
them are to be found some of the most malignant and
Supra, n. 6, 637 et 8eq.
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recidivistic offenders . . . [including] the sociopathic
type. They have shown evidences of life-long social
maladjustment reaching back into early childhood.
English writers have designated these individuals
'moral imbeciles' or 'moral defectives'.
"They are often very bright, attractive, and superficially ingratiating. But this amiability is a skillful
masking of an overwhelming hostility. They are socially irresponsible. Other persons are merely objects
to be manipulated for their own hedonistic purposes.
* * * They possess no loyalties and are suspicious of
others. Indeed, this incapacity for establishing satisfying and meaningful relationships with other individuals is their nuclear defect. This makes psychiatric
treatment so difficult, for psychotherapy - to be effective - requires that the patient establish a significant
degree of identification with the therapist ....
"Sociopaths seemingly do not learn by experience,
since despite admonitions and punishments, they continue their same pattern of objectionable conduct.
This is one of the characteristics that suggests that
their disorder is essentially neurotic, since the repetitive element is constantly present in disturbances that
are neurotic in origin. Many of the check forgers,
swindlers, and confidence men are recruited from their
ranks.
"There are, of course, many other types of psychopathic offenders. Among them are the violently aggressive and sadistic criminals. In most instances they
have been subjected to harsh cruelties during their
formative years in the guise of parental discipline.
Life is for them not a very precious commodity neither their own nor that of other persons.
"Most sexual offenders, too, are neurotic criminals ....
"There is a subcategory of offenders whose crimes
arise from what are known as personality trait disturbances, who also belong in the large, heterogeneous
group . . . who occasionally, under apparently slight
provocation, explode with volcanic force."
n Omitted are Dr. Guttmacher's discussion of the small groups (a) who
engage in antisocial behavior in order to achieve punishment at the hands
of the law, and (b) who appear to court capture by the authorities because
they feel helpless before their own antisocial impulses and compulsions
and have a real fear bf them.
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"5. The psychotic criminal, the individual whose
antisocial behavior is a symptom of his insanity. He
suffers from one of the major mental disorders. These
insanities are marked by regressive behavior in which
the ego is overwhelmed by primitive aggressive drives.
These may be directed against himself or against
others. As bizarre and as unintelligible as much of insane behavior appears to be, it has an economic utility
for the individual. Were we wise enough, its meaning
and significance could in every instance be deciphered.
"Only one and a half to two per cent of criminals
are definitely psychotic. There is, of course, no sharp
dividing line between health and disease. At what
point the psychological disorganization of the individual reaches sufficient proportions to be designated a
psychosis is a matter of judgment. This problem presents its greatest difficulty in cases of short-lived
psychosis. There are cases of temporary insanity.
Alcoholic deleria and confusional states associated
with epilepsy are widely recognized as such. Combat
psychiatrists saw men who succumbed under great
stress for brief periods successfully mobilize their
psychological defenses and rapidly regain their
stability."
II.
The writers of the New Testament believed that persons suffering from various types of mental illness were
possessed by the devil or by demons. On the other hand,
the Romans recognized several different types of insanity.2 The Arabs treated mental disease as such, but in
Western Europe, during the Middle Ages, the New Testament ideas prevailed. Indeed, exorcism is still practiced by
certain groups, and trials for witchcraft were held in New
England and elsewhere as recently as two hundred
years ago.
Early in the 16th Century, Paracelsus published two
essays, "Fools" and "Afflictions Depriving Man of his Reason", which approached the problem in a scientific manner.
A few others adopted a similar approach at the time of the
Renaissance, but it was only toward the close of the 18th
Century that mental disorder was scientifically studied.
2They called them: 1. allenatio mentis, aliena mens, alienatus mente;
2. amentia, amens; 3. dementia, demens; 4. furor, furibsus, the most common term in legal writings; 5. Insania, insanus; 6, mente captus; 7. vesania,
vesanus; 8. non compos menitis.
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Since then a number of ideas have prevailed from time to
time; emphasis has been placed on (a) organic changes in
the brain; (b) psychogenic factors; and (c) biological and
psycho-biological reactions. Modern psychological knowledge leads many to regard the problem as one of instinctive forces conflicting with environment and resulting in
a failure of adjustment. In that view, the mental symptoms cannot be rightly spoken of as a disease but as types
of reaction through the effort on the part of the individual
to meet the conditions with which he is faced.
Before the advent of dynamic psychiatry, great stress
was laid upon heredity. During the early decades of this
century, sterilization laws for the mentally defective and
certain groups of the insane, as well as for major recidivists
and sex offenders, were passed in many states. With the
development of modern psychiatry, however, the pessimistic fatalism toward insanity gave way to an overzealous
optimism in regard to the treatment of mental disorders
and an almost total disregard of heredity, since it does
not lend itself to therapeutic efforts.
Although Dr. Guttmacher does not concur in the extreme view of some psychiatrists in opposition to the legal
doctrine of free will, he does feel that ". . . everyone who
has worked in psychiatry must have been impressed with
the vastly unequal opportunities afforded individuals to
develop healthy egos", and that "... the degree of mental
health that the individual possesses bears a direct relationship to the freedom of choice which he is able to exercise."' 3 A daily awareness of these facts gives psychiatrists
an unusual tolerance for the vagaries of human behavior,
whether it be criminal or noncriminal. Dr. Guttmacher
feels that "in psychiatry, one's orientations must, in large
measure, be deterministic", but, he says:
"It is surely scientifically unsound to hold that men
must be divided into two distinct categories, the responsible and the irresponsible. There must be degrees of responsibility. Yet, as residents of the world
of reality, we have to admit that the vast majority of
men must be held responsible for their behavior.""
Professor John Whitehorn, a leading eclectic psychiatrist, wrote in 1953:
Guttmacher, The Psyohiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23
Law and Contemp. Prob. 633, 634 (1958).
Ibid., 634.
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" 'So far as I can see, there exists a range of freedom of choice between different possibilities in conduct or behavior. The range of freedom of choice appears to me to be much narrower than is implied in
most of the exhortations to reform by 'will power',
and the range of freedom of choice is particularly restricted in the condition that we characterize professionally as illness, but seldom if ever is the range of
freedom reduced to zero, as is implied in a strictly
'15
deterministic view'.
Although there has been no psychiatric study which
gives us a true measure of the incidence of psychiatric
morbidity in the criminal population, there have been
statistical surveys which bear on the point. These surveys
indicate that about 80% of criminals are psychiatrically
normal. Nevertheless, some psychiatrists are loath to accept this conclusion, and prefer to believe that a large proportion of criminals are psychiatrically abnormal. Dr.
Guttmacher suggests one answer to this view. In 1957, the
homicide rate for Negroes compared to whites in Baltimore was eleven times their, incidence in the population;
but there is no study indicating that the psychiatric morbidity rate for Negroes is much higher than for whites.
It is difficult for doctors, lawyers, and laymen to understand each other when discussing insanity. 16 Webster's
New International Dictionary,16a defining "insanity", says:
-Ibid., 635.
The esoteric vocabulary of psychiatry Is a serious stumbling block.
The ENCYOLOPEDIA BRITTANICA states: "Though it is true that different symptoms of insanity tend to arrange ithemselves into groups,
we must bear in mind that the clinical pictures described under their
special headings are not by any means clear-cut entities; they are
not diseases in the strict sense of the term, but types of reaction. Yet,
for descriptive purposes, some classification is needed, and though no
classification is entirely satisfactory, the following will best meet
our requirements:
1. Manic-depressive insanity; 2. Dementia praecox (Schizophrenia);
3. Paranoia group; (characterized by physical symptoms. No constant
changes in brain yet established. Best understood of employment of
psycholbgical conception.)
4. Imbecility and idiocy; 5. Senile dementia; (characterized by
qualitative defect of mental functions. Generally accompanied by
observable defect or changes in the brain.)
6. Toxic insanity; 7. General paralysis of the insane; 8. Organic
brain disease; 9. Epileptic insanity (Diseases of the brain invariably
or mostly accompanied by mental symptoms.)
Since we are dealing only with insane states and not mental disorder, the neuroses and psycho-neuroses such as neurasthenia anxiety
and compulsion neuroses and hysteria are not, included."
16,
2nd ed., 1948.
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"la. Insanity is rather a social and legal term than
a medical term, and implies mental disorder resulting
in inability to manage one's affairs and perform one's
social duties. The term has been variously defined by
statutes and variously interpreted in the courts. It
covers a variety of disorders, the principal forms being
manic-depressive insanity, dementia precox, 17 paranoia, general paralysis, and the alcoholic insanities.
Mental deficiency, temporary delirious conditions, and
trance are sometimes but not usually included. Psychoneuroses and psychopathic states are distinguished
from insanity, but with no sharp line of demarcation.
2. For legal purposes, as sometimes essentially defined:
Such unsoundness of mental condition as, with regard
to any matter under action, modifies or does away
with individual legal responsibility or capacity. The
test of insanity for the determination of legal responsibility or capacity, criminal or civil, differs from that
by which insanity is determined for medical purposes,
with the result that various conditions which are medically recognized as insane are not considered as doing
away with legal responsibility or capacity."
In recent years, however, the medical profession has
shied away from the use of the word "insanity", many
doctors claiming that it has no medical meaning. They prefer the terms "mental disease", "mental deficiency", or
"mental disorder", and frequently use the term "mental
illness" to include all the other terms.
Our knowledge of mental illness has increased greatly
since the days of Bedlam, but we have been unwilling to
provide adequately for the care or the cure of the mentally ill. The problem has now reached such proportions
that we can no longer sweep it under the rug.
In 1957 the Legislative Council of Maryland appointed
a Committee of distinguished doctors, judges, legislators
and others to study the laws for the commitment of mentally ill persons, with Dr. Guttmacher as chairman.
The Committee filed a report in December, 1958, saying:
"It is the consensus of the Committee, that the
philosophical concept of criminal irresponsibility because of mental disease is, from both a moral and
social point of view, worthy of preservation. * * * Itis
generally believed that the threat of punishment has
17Now usually called schizophrenia.

1959]

INSANITY AS CRIMINAL DEFENSE

281

effectiveness in deterring the normal individual from
engaging in antisocial behavior. However, such threats
have little or no force in influencing the behavior of
the mentally diseased individual. Furthermore, making an example of an insane offender by punishing him
would have no deterrent influence on the general citizenry. Indeed, it would have a brutalizing effect and
produce only disrespect for the Law."
In his opinion in Sauer v. United States,17a Judge Barnes
also said:
"Whatever we may conclude to be the objectives
of the criminal law, one traditional result has been
punishment. Functioning under such a system, our
society does not assess punishment where it cannot
ascribe blame. It is inimical to the morals and ideals
of an organized social order to impose punishment
where blame cannot be affixed."

III.
The prevailing test of responsibility did not spring fullpanoplied from the head of Lord Chief Justice Tindal; it
is the result of a long development.
Many ancient systems of law recognized a distinction
between intentional and unintentional homicide, permitting compensation for the latter instead of the customary
death penalty. Insanity usually was not a defense, although
from about the time of Justinian it was recognized as a
ground for executive clemency in the Roman Empire and
in certain other areas. In England during the 13th Century, pardons for persons committing homicides while of
unsound mind were not unusual. By Edward III's reign,
in the 14th Century, complete madness was recognized as
a defense to a criminal charge. In the early 17th Century,
Sir Edward Coke, citing Littleton, said:
"... that it is a maxim of the common law, that the
partie shall not disable himselfe. But this holdeth
only in civil causes; for in criminall causes, as felonie,
&c. the act and wrong of a madman shall not be imputed to him, for that in those causes, actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea, and he is amens (idest) sine
i

241 F. 2d 640, 648 (9th Cir. 1957).
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mente, without his mind or discretion; and furiosus
solo furore punitur, a madman is only punished by
madnesse."' I
Sir Matthew Hale (1609-1676), in his History of the
Pleas of the Crown, said that "absolute madness", a "total
deprivation of memory", would excuse a criminal act, for
a person then cannot be deemed to possess the necessary
"animo felonico". Partial insanity also could excuse, but
"this", said Hale, "is a matter of great difficulty".
In Arnold's case," in 1723, after quoting Coke's and
Hale's definitions, Judge Tracey harked back to a maxim
of Bracton's and said that in order to avail himself of the
defense of insanity "a man must be totally deprived of his
understanding and memory, so as not to know what he is
doing, no more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast".
In Hadfield's case,2" in 1800, where the great Erskine
appeared for the defense, the evidence showed clearly that
the defendant was under a delusion. The Chief Justice
practically directed a verdict of not guilty because of insanity, concluding:
"I believe it is necessary for me to submit to you,
whether you will not find that the prisoner, at the
time he committed the act, was not so under the guidance of reason, as to be answerable for this act, enormous and atrocious as it appeared to be."
A few years later, in Bellingham's case, 2 1 in 1812, Lord
Chief Justice Mansfield is quoted as having said:
"The single question was whether, at the time this
fact (sic) was committed, he [Bellingham] possessed
a sufficient degree of understanding to distinguish
good from evil, right from wrong, and whether murder
was a crime not only against the law of God, but
against the law of his country."
The famous M'Naghten case22 arose in 1843, when
M'Naghten shot the secretary of Prime Minister Robert
Peel, believing him to be Peel. The case aroused great
public interest; Prince Albert sat with the judges part of
Quoted in BIGGS, THE GuiLTy

MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF

HOMICIDE (1955) 85.

1016 Sitate Trials 695 (1723), quoted by Bics, 8upra, n. 18, 88.
1027 State Trials 1281 (1800), quoted by BIGGS, 8upra, n. 18, 90.
2Quoted
by Bioos, supra, n. 18, 91.
210
Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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the time. M'Naghten was undoubtedly under the influence
of a mental disorder symptomized by delusions of persecution. At the end of the testimony and argument, the judges
stopped the case, and the Solicitor General said:
"Gentlemen of the Jury, after the intimation I have
received from the Bench, I feel that I should not be
properly discharging my duty to the Crown and to the
public, if I asked you to give your verdict in this case
against the prisoner."
Lord Chief Justice Tindal then put to the Jury the
question whether:
"... on the whole of the evidence you have heard,
you are satisfied that at the time the act was committed, for the commission of which the prisoner now
stands charged, he had that competent use of his understanding as that he knew that he was doing, by
the very act itself, a wicked and a wrong thing? If he
was not sensible at the time he committed that act,
that it was a violation of the law of God or of man,
undoubtedly he was not responsible for that act, or
liable to any punishment whatever flowing from that
act... [and] ... I cannot help remarking, in common
with my learned brethren, that the whole of the medical evidence is on one side, and that there is no part of
it which leaves any doubt on the mind ... if on balancing the evidence in your minds, you think the prisoner
capable of distinguishing between right and wrong,
then he was a responsible agent and liable to all the
penalties the law imposes. If not so, . . . then you will
probably
guilty. ' ')2 2anot take upon yourselves to find the prisoner
The jury rendered a verdict of not guilty on the ground of
insanity and M'Naghten was removed to a hospital.
The Queen was not pleased; she wrote a letter to the
Prime Minister referring to the trials of Oxford and
M'Naghten, and noting that the judges
"... allow and advise the Jury to pronounce the verdict
of Not Guilty on account of Insanity, - whilst everybody is morally convinced that both malefactors were
perfectly conscious and aware of what they did! It
appears from this, that the force of the law is entirely
Quoted by Bios, supra, n. 18, 101.
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put into the judge's hands, and that it depends merely
upon his charge whether the law is to be applied or
not. Could not the Legislature lay down that rule
which the Lord Chancellor does in his paper, and
which Chief Justice Mansfield did in the case of Bellingham; and why could not the judges be bound to
interpret the law in this and no other sense in their
charges to the Juries?"2
The House of Lords, after debate, decided to take the
opinion of the Common Law Judges, and propounded five
questions. Lord Chief Justice Tindal answered for fourteen of the fifteen Judges. In the course of his opinion
he said:
"... that the jurors ought to be told in all cases that
every man is to be presumed to be sane and to possess
a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his
crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time
of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did
not know that he was doing what was wrong."2
This opinion was fully approved by the House of Lords.
The so-called M'Naghten Rules were generally adopted
in the United States, except in New Hampshire. The leadLing case in Maryland is Spencer v. State, 4 where Chief
Judge Alvey said:
"And according to the law, as we find it settled by
the great preponderance of judicial authority, if the
party accused be competent to form and execute a
criminal design; or, in other words, if at the time of
the commission of the alleged offense, he had capacity
and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong, and understand the nature and
consequences of his act, as applied to himself, he is
a responsible agent, and amenable to the criminal law
of the land for the consequences of his act."
In fourteen States and in the Federal courts the
M'Naghten Rules have been supplemented by various
Quoted by Bioos, supra, n. 18, 103.
Ibid., 105.
-69 Md. 28, 37, 13 A. 809 (1888).
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formulations of an "irresistible impulse" test. For example, in Parsons v. State, 5 the court said:
"No one can deny that there must be two constituent elements of legal responsibility in the commission of every crime, and no rule can be just and
reasonable which fails to recognize either of them: (1)
Capacity of intellectual discrimination; and (2) Freedom of will.... If therefore, it be true, as matter of
fact, that the disease of insanity can, in its action on
the human brain through a shattered nervous organization, or in any other mode, so affect the mind as to
subvert the freedom of the will, and thereby destroy
the power of the victim to choose between the right
and wrong, although he perceive it - by which we
mean the power of volition to adhere in action to the
right and abstain from the wrong, - is such a one
criminally responsible for an act done under the influence of such controlling disease? We clearly think
not. * * * "

That formulation has been criticized as limited to spontaneous sudden feeling, whereas such urges may be the
result of long periods of brooding and reflection. In his
opinion in Sauer v. United States, 25a Judge Barnes recognized that "irresistible impulse" is perhaps an inept phrase,
but he concluded that "it can be used until a better semantic handle has been created."
Maryland has refused to modify the Spencer rule by an
irresistible impulse test.
The Federal courts, except the courts in the District of
Columbia, must take account of Davis v. United States.8
At the second trial of that case, the judge charged the
jury as follows:
"The term 'insanity' as used in this defense means
such a perverted and deranged condition of the mental
and moral faculties as to render a person incapable
of distinguishing between right and wrong, or unconscious at the time of the nature of the act he is
committing, or where, though conscious of it and able
to distinguish between right and wrong and know
that the act is wrong, yet his will, by which I mean
the governing power of his mind, has been otherwise
581 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 859 (1887).
241 F. 2d 640, 650 (9th Cir. 1957).
1160 U.S. 469 (1895) and 165 U.S. 373 (1897).
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than voluntarily so completely destroyed that his actions 2are not subject to it, and are beyond his control." a
The Supreme Court held that the charge, "under the circumstances of this case, was in no degree prejudicial to
the rights of the defendant. '' 26b The Supreme Court thus
apparently approved the test as being either incapacity
(resulting from some mental disease or defect) to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to the
act, or the inability to refrain from committing the act.
There is nothing in subsequent Supreme Court opinions
on this question, which casts doubt on this construction of
the Davis cases. Indeed, they serve only to fortify the view
here expressed. The Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
are agreed that the Courts of Appeals are not free to revise
the law of criminal responsibility even if they are disposed

to do

so7

In some respects the courts of the District of Columbia
are like courts in the several states.2" The District has its
own criminal code, which includes a provision that a person found not guilty because of insanity shall29 be committed to a mental hospital. There is no3 °similar statute
applicable to trials in other Federal courts.
In Durham v. United States,"' Judge Bazelon said:
"We find that as an exclusive criterion the rightwrong test is inadequate in that (a) it does not take
sufficient account of psychic realities and scientific
knowledge, and (b) it is based upon one symptom and
so cannot validly be applied in all circumstances. We
find that the 'irresistible impulse' test is also inadequate in that it gives no recognition to mental illness
characterized by brooding and reflection and so relegates acts caused by such illness to the application
of the inadequate right-wrong test. We conclude that
a broader test should be adopted.
"The rule we now hold must be applied on the
retrial of this case and in future cases is not unlike
Davis v. U.S., 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897).

b Ibid., 378.

27Howard
v. U.S., 232 F. 2d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Sauer v. U.S., 241
F. 2d 640, 643, 644 (9th Cir. 1957). The Eighth Circuit evidently agrees,
Voss v. United States, 259 F. 2d 699 (8th Cir. 1958).
2 Fisher v. U.S., 328 U.S. 463, 476, 477 (1946).
2 Until 1955 the commitment was discretionary. D.C. Code (1951)
§ 24-301.
10Nor is there any similar statute in Maryland.
1 214 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir., 1954).
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that followed by the New Hampshire court since 1870.
It is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or mental defect.
"We use 'disease' in the sense of a condition which
is considered capable of either improving or deteriorating. We use 'defect' in the sense of a condition
which is not considered capable of either improving
or deteriorating and which may be either congenital,
or the result of injury, or' '31the residual effect of a
physical or mental disease. .
The Durham rule has been praised or condemned by
many writers3 2 but has not yet been followed by any other
court. Grave concern has been expressed over the interpretation to be given the words "disease", "defect", and
"product".
The words "disease" and "defect" have been construed
by many commentators, and by some judges in the District of Columbia, to include the conditions usually described as psychopathic. If this construction is correct, it
means that a very large percentage of the most dangerous
criminals would have to be found not guilty and set at
liberty in other Federal courts and in Maryland.
Many judges have found the term "product of", as
used in the Durham case difficult to understand and difficult to apply. For example, the United States Military
Court of Appeals has said:8 3
"In the first place, we are - it must be confessed
- somewhat troubled by the uncertainty of the criterion set down in Durham to the effect that, to be
exculpable, a criminal act must be the 'product' of
mental abnormality. Indeed, there may be some controversy concerning the scientific validity of the premise that a criminal act may be committed which is
not, in some sense, a product of whatever abnormality
may coexist."
Judge Prettyman, speaking for the District of Columbia
Court in Carter v. United States, 4 recognized these criticisms and said:
8-Ibid., 874.
2 Including Sobeloff, From MNaghten to Durham, And Beyond A
Discussion of Insanity and The Criminal Law, 15 Md. L. Rev. 93 (1955) ;
same article entitled, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From MoNaughten
to Durham, and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955).
"U.S. v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 322 (1954).
4252 F. 2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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"When we say the defense of insanity requires that
the act be a 'product of' a disease, we mean that the
facts on the record are such that the trier of the facts
is enabled to draw a reasonable inference that the accused would not have committed the act he did commit if he had not been diseased as he was. There must
be a relationship between the disease and the act, and
that relationship, whatever it may be in degree, must
be, as we have already said, critical in its effect in
respect to the act. By 'critical' we mean decisive,
determinative, causal; we mean to convey the idea
inherent in the phrases 'because of', 'except for', 'without which', 'but for', 'effect of', 'result of', 'causative
factor'; the disease made the effective or decisive difference between doing and not doing the act. The
short phrases 'product of' and 'causal connection' are
not intended to be precise, as though they were chemical formulae. They mean that the facts concerning the
disease and the facts concerning the act are such as to
justify reasonably the conclusion that 'But for this
dis'' 4
ease the act would not have been committed'. a a
It is a matter of opinion how far this clarifies the matter.
One may agree that the criticism of the M'Naghten test
is valid without accepting the Durham rule as a desirable
substitute.
The indefiniteness of the term "product" lead the
American Law Institute to reject the Durham test in its
proposed Model Penal Code. 5 Tentative Draft No. 4, of
that Code, Section 4.01, recommends the following test:
"(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
"(2) The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct."
An alternative rule, favored by Professor Wechsler
(the reporter) and a minority of the Institute, is as follows:
"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental dis"Ibid., 617.

See Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Respon8ibility, 22 Univ. of
Chidago L. Rev. 367 (1955).
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ease or defect his capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law is so substantially impaired
that he cannot justly be held responsible.""a
Judges and jurors alike are inclined to apply this test, consciously or unconsciously.
The Maryland Committee, referred to above, recommends a test similar to the test recommended by the
American Law Institute, but substituting the word "sufficient" for the word "substantial", which seems to me to
be an improvement. 6
The Committee presented a number of objections to the
rule in Spencer v. State.8 The first objection was that the
rule is unclear and ambiguous. The Committee referred to:
".... the difficulty that inheres in the ordinary meaning
of the word 'know', as applied to persons suffering
from serious mental disease. The fact that a defendant can verbalize, at the time of examination, the
difference between right and wrong, may be wholly
misleading. An individual, who is mentally seriously
disordered, may have the hypothetical knowledge to
make such a discernment but may be incapable of incorporating it into his own being, so that it becomes
part of the system of values that directs his actions."
The Committee also noted that legal decisions as to the
true meaning of the words "right" and "wrong" have been
in conflict. Some have held that it is moral right and wrong
that is under consideration, others that legal right and
wrong is meant.
The Committee's second objection is that the Spencer
Rule improperly confines the inquiry to the effect of mental disease upon the actor's cognitive or intellectual capacity. The M'Naghten Rule from which it was copied
was devised more than a century ago, when the intellecModel Penal Code, § 4.01 (Alternative Formulation a).
See s upra, p. 288. The statute recommended by the Committee would
read as follows:
"Where the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity shall be
pleaded in any criminal case In this State, the person making such
a defense shall not be responsible for criminal conduct If, as a result
of mental disease or deficiency of Intelligence alt the time of such conduct, he lacks sufficient capacity either to understand and appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. The term 'mental disease or deficiency' as used in this
section shall not include defective delinquents as that term is defined
in Article 31B of this Code, title 'Defective Delinquents'."
'"69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809 (1888).
'
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tual function of the mind was thought to be separate and
distinct and wholly insulated from emotional impact or
control. Modern psychology has disproved this belief.
The Committee opposes the use of the "irresistible impulse" device to remedy this weakness in the rule. The
Committee feels that it is extremely difficult to determine
when an impulse is irresistible or when it is merely not
resisted. Nearly all of the antisocial acts carried out by
a mentally diseased person can be temporarily postponed,
so the word "impulse" has an erroneous connotation. In
the opinion of the Committee, the concept of inability to
conform one's conduct to the requirements of law far more
effectively represents the type of mental disease in which
disturbances of the will and the emotions are paramount
symptoms.
Finally, the Committee notes that dissatisfaction with
the knowledge of right and wrong test of responsibility
among American and British psychiatrists is nearly unanimous. Recent polls of psychiatric opinion in this country
have shown that less than ten percent of American psychiatrists believe them to be satisfactory. The Committee
says:
"The psychiatrist in his daily work with his office
or hospital patients is not called upon to determine
whether they can distinguish right from wrong. This
is completely outside of his area of consideration, and
he feels no special competence in assisting the court
in making such judgments. As one eminent psychiatrist expressed it, '. . . the psychiatrist is prevented
from using the language in which he has been trained
to organize his thoughts and in which the meaning,
the fringes of meaning and the implications of each
term are familiar to him. Instead, he is forced to
testify in a language not his own, and he cannot be
sure of the implications which his words may seem to
carry to the judge or the jury.' Most psychiatrists are
loath to invade the guilt finding responsibilities of the
judge and the jury. They do believe that they can
determine the presence of mental disease and how it
affects the defendant's judgment, social behavior and
self control. They do not wish to go further. It is our
belief that the formulation of the definition of responsibility which we have recommended more nearly
meets these requirements than does the old Rule."
The Committee also noted that Maryland is one of the
eight states that have the anomalous provision that a de-
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fendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, and who
has recovered by the time of trial, must forthwith be released. It is the view of the Committee that the community deserves the assurance that there will be no probable recurrence of the insane act, which can only be obtained by mandatory commitment and a period of observation in a psychiatric hospital.
"When a defendant has himself alleged that he
was insane and irresponsible for a criminal act and
has been so found, his release immediately after trial
cannot help raising fears and doubts among the members of the community in which he lives. They are
rightfully fearful lest a jury of twelve laymen may
have acted imprudently on a complex technical issue,
and they are apprehensive lest there be a recurrence
of the mental disorder, even though it had apparently
abated."
The Committee favors the adoption of a law requiring one
year's hospitalization.
A statute providing for the mandatory commitment of
persons found not guilty because of insanity is a necessary
concomitant of whatever test or rule is followed or adopted.
The criticisms of the M'Naghten and Spencer rules and
of the irresistible impulse test, stated by the Maryland
Committee, show the need for some modification of the
prevailing rules. Judges and legislators should consider
the present state of medical knowledge and opinion, and
should attempt to work out a test under which the lawyers
and the doctors will be able to ask and answer questions
which will have meaning for both of them - and for the
public.
Of course, criminal responsibility
is a legal question.
87
Professor Wechsler recently said:
"As courts and commentators have repeated to the
point of tedium, the criteria are addressed to the question of when disorder or defect should be accorded the
specific legal consequences of a defense to criminal
conviction, with the special differences in dealing with
the individual that this special legal consequence entails. Thus the criteria are not concerned with the indicia of diagnosis of disease; they are concerned with
the effects that a disease must have in the defendant if
it is to work the exculpation claimed."
822 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 367, 373 (1955), quoted in Sauer v. U.S., 241
F. 2d 640, 648 (1957).
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What rule then should be adopted? It seems to the
author to depend upon whether we are going to place our
principal emphasis on the protection of society or on the
proposition that society does not assess punishment where
it cannot ascribe blame. The more conservative psychiatrists seem to agree that about twenty percent of all offenders are suffering from some type of mental illness which
may be said to contribute to their delinquency to some
degree. Included among the twenty percent are many
of the most dangerous criminals - the psychopaths and
the sociopaths. If the Durham rule were generally adopted
and interpreted as it is in the District of Columbia, conscientious judges and jurors might well come to the conclusion that, if the defendant was suffering from any
mental illness, the criminal act was in some sense a product of that abnormality.
It is said that the percentage of acquittals by reason
of insanity has not greatly increased in the District of
Columbia since the adoption of the Durham rule. There
may be several reasons for that: the ordinary defendant
may not yet have learned of his opportunity;8 he may not
be financially able to employ a battery of psychiatrists;
lawyers and psychiatrists may be approaching the Durham
rule in the same way that they are said to approach the
M'Naghten rules; and judges and jurors may still be applying, consciously or unconsciously, the alternative American Law Institute test, and doing what they think is just.
The University of Chicago group, in its research study
of juries, has found that the results are pretty much the
same, whichever test is used.
If our knowledge of mental illness were more exact;
if honest psychiatrists generally agreed in their testimony
to a greater extent than they now do;89 if we had adequate facilities for the care and detention, if not the cure,
of psychopaths and sociopaths; and if the laws were such
and were so administered that the dangerous psychopath
and sociopath, as well as the psychotic, would ordinarily
be detained in custody unless and until cured; then, in
that Utopia, we might safely apply the Durham rule. In
the present kaleidoscopic state of psychiatric opinion, in
"He will learn quickly enough in almost any correctional institution.
3 It has been suggested by a psychiatrist that you do not get greater disagreement as to diagnosis among psychiatrists than among many other physicians; that the disagreement comes when "legal diagnostic judgments"
must be made by psychiatrists.
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the world in which we live, the protection of society calls
for a different rule.4"
The tests proposed by the American Law Institute
and by the Maryland Committee have much to recommend
them.4" They meet the principal criticisms of the rightwrong test. They also meet most of the objections to the
Durham rule. They recognize the basic principle that the
protection of society is the primary function of the criminal law. They should be given serious consideration by
doctors, lawyers, judges and legislators.
,0A statute recently adopted in England allows a defense of diminished
responsibility due to abnormality of mind in cages of homicide; if the
defense succeeds, a charge of murder is reduced to one of manslaughter.
it will be interesting to see how this Act works out over a period of years.
41 See United States v. Hopkins, 169 F. Supp. 187, 190 (D.C. Md. 1958).

